Does the idea of intersectionality make it impossible to talk about specifically 'feminist' aims for theory or political action?

 

   Intersectionality has been central to, and has shaped, much feminist discourse since its conception in 1989 (Garry 2011). During this time, it has been applied by numerous feminist scholars and political activists, who have moulded the theory to fit their own understandings of feminism. However, despite its popularity, determining whether theories of intersectionality are adequate to define gender and organise around it, has been a contentious topic of feminist debate. While intersectional feminists are worried about essentialised conceptions of womanhood that fail to account for all women, their critics worry that the focus intersectionality places on difference could lead to fragmentation and thus debilitate the feminist movement. This essay will be analysing the extent to which intersectionality supposes a risk to a joint feminist movement, both in terms of theory and political action. To do so, this essay will begin by examining the concept of intersectionality, as conceived by Kimberlé Crenshaw, accounting for its origins in Black and Third World feminism. It will continue by outlining the critiques of intersectionality made by some feminist theorists that accuse intersectionality of fragmenting the feminist movement thus rendering the concept of feminism useless. These critiques will be explored exclusively through the work of Zack and Gunnarsson. Finally, this essay will critically analyse Zack and Gunnarsson’s criticisms on two bases. Firstly, by examining how intersectionality affects the creation of feminist scholarship, drawing on theories of critical realism and postmodernism. Secondly, by examining intersectionality’s effect on joint political action, drawing on Crenshaw’s conception of identities as coalitions and supporting this conception through the real-life example of the activism group of “Somos Hermanas”.

 

Intersectionality: origins and definition.

   It is generally understood that cohesive political movements hold more power than individual demands for action (Crenshaw, 1997). Being aware of this, women have historically organised together to challenge their shared subjugation under misogyny and the patriarchy. Far from being unsuccessful, this joint effort has managed to shift the understanding of women’s oppression from a private matter to a systemic issue that affects women as a class (Crenshaw, 1991). Such an acknowledgement of issues as systemic is a characteristic of what has been called identity politics. However, the issue with identity politics is that it has the potential to ignore differences within identity groups (Crenshaw, 1991). Feminism has made this mistake. In understanding women as a cohesive class, feminist theory and action has falsely universalised women’s experiences (May, 2014). In the words of Strickland “we are now presented with a generic woman, a term like the universal man or human that hides differences in situation, experience, privilege, and power” (1994, p. 269). Additionally, feminism has assumed that gender is independent from other variables such as race, class, and sexuality, thus silencing minority experiences in favour of a western, white, middle-class perspective (May, 2014). A prime example of this phenomenon can be observed in the work of Simone de Beauvoir where she compares women to what she calls “the Jews, the black, the yellow, the proletariat, slaves, servants, the common people” (De Beauvoir, 1949, p. 49). In doing this, she is ignoring that there are women within the population she compares women to.

   Against these monocausal explanations and false universalisations, Black and Third World Women have advocated for the consideration of difference among women within feminist theory and action. They have argued that the content of feminism has not been based on common traits between women but on the interests of some who have the power to define what womanhood means from themselves and others (Strickland, 1994). The long history of this advocacy can be traced back to 1851 when Sojourner Truth delivered a speech titled “Ain’t I a woman” in the Women's Convention in Ohio. In her speech she highlighted the racism and classism of the women’s movement and its assumptions of the living conditions of non-white non-middle-class women. She asserted that difference in material conditions did not delegitimise her womanhood or claim for equal rights (Davis, 1981), even if her position was often silenced by the movement. Drawing from this history of Black and Third World feminism, and to fill the gaps she observed in feminist theory, Kimberlé Crenshaw came up with the term “intersectionality”. She theorised that, in the context of employment discrimination (Crenshaw, 1981) and violence against women (Crenshaw, 1991), we must attend to difference because the challenges many women confront are shaped by other aspects of their identity (Crenshaw, 1997). Therefore, to adequately analyse the experiences of, for example, black women, gender cannot be separated from class and race (Crenshaw, 1991). These three “axes of oppression” (Collins, 1990) interact with one another. They influence the lives of non-white women and produce new marginalised identities that are not simply the addition of the three “axes”. In this sense, intersectionality produces better informed theory that accurately accounts for the lived reality of more women.

   While there are other definitions and understandings of what intersectionality entails, since, as pointed out in the introduction, it has been a central focus of feminist scholarship for several decades. Engaging with such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. For concision purposes, analysis and criticisms will be carried out considering this “original” conception of intersectionality.

 

Critiques of intersectionality: fragmentation.

   Intersectionality has been criticised by multiple schools of feminist thought, such as for example Marxist feminism (Bohrer, 2018), and decolonial feminism (Lugones, 2014). Nevertheless, the focus of this essay will be on the critiques carried out by Zack (2005) and Gunnarsson (2011). Given that their critique of fragmentation is exemplary of a common narrow understanding of intersectionality and that an analysis of their arguments allows to effectively emphasize the core strengths of intersectionality as a theory.

   In A Defence of the Category ‘Women’ (2011), Gunnarsson draws from other feminist theorists, such as McCall, to criticise the “anticategorical” approach to intersectionality. Such a conception of intersectionality has been taken up by postmodernist thinkers such as Butler, that argue that, due to the inseparability of gender from other factors such as race, class and sexuality, the category of “woman” ought to be abandoned (Butler, 1992, 1993, 1999). Against this conception, Gunnarsson defends the maintenance of the category “woman” as a necessary factor of feminism. She carries out this defence using the theory of critical realism as a middle ground between liberal and postmodernist feminism, an approach also taken by McCall (2005). Gunnarsson states that “the tools of critical realism allow for a radically different understanding. According to the critical realist perspective, people exist only by virtue of the relations that constitute them, through the medium of structural positions” (2011, 32-33).

   In crafting this relational definition of ‘woman’, Gunnarsson draws from Naomi Zack’s book Inclusive Feminism: A Third Wave Theory of Women’s Commonality (2005). In this book Zack claims that “as a theory of women's identity, intersectionality is not inclusive insofar as members of a specific intersection of race and class can create only their own feminisms” (2005, 8). She is therefore arguing that intersectionality fragments feminist theory and solidarity because individuals that exist within each intersection will advocate for their intersection only. Therefore, similarly to Gunnarsson’s argument, she defends that ‘woman’ is a necessary category for feminism. She proceeds to state that “what women have in common is a relation” (2005, 9). She believes that, in using a relational understanding of womanhood, ‘woman’ becomes a comprehensive category with the potential to include all women.

   To summarize, what both Zack and Gunnarsson seem to be arguing is the following. Intersectionality is inherently ‘anticategorical’. This rejection of categories leads to the fragmentation feminism, both in terms of theory and political action. Therefore, feminism ought to defend the category of ‘woman’ but define it comprehensively, in a relational sense and in accordance with critical realism. This would lead to a universal ‘woman’ that does not falsely universalise the experience of all women. The implications that these arguments have for intersectionality in relation to theory and political action will be analysed in turn.

 

Intersectionality in the context of a cohesive body of feminist theory.

   This section will engage with Zack and Gunnarsson’s arguments as they are related to the creation of feminist theory. The analysis will be carried out on two bases. Firstly, intersectionality is not a closed theory, and much of it is in fact left for interpretation (Davis, 2008). Secondly, feminism is already not a cohesive body of knowledge, as numerous theories and agendas fit into the category (Maj, 2013).

   In Intersectionality as buzzword: A sociology of science perspective on what makes a feminist theory successful (2008), Davis argues that Intersectionality is an inherently ambiguous and open theory. Davis states that “intersectionality initiates a process of discovery alerting us to the fact that the world around us is always more complicated and contradictory than we ever could have anticipated. It compels feminists to grapple with this complexity in their scholarship, it does not provide written in stone guidelines for doing feminist inquiry” (2008, 79). Therefore, intersectionality serves as a tool to examine feminist theory, to find any gaps and false universalisms that will in fact prevent feminism from being universally applicable. This task is perfectly compatible with maintaining gender categories and a shared theoretical enterprise (Davis, 2008).

   Two conclusions can be drawn from Davis’ argument. Firstly, the ‘anticategorical’ approach that Zack and Gunnarsson criticise, is not a complete account of what intersectionality is. While they offer a complete critique of postmodernist conceptions of intersectionality, presenting said critique as a one of intersectionality in general fails to account for the multiplicity of intersectionality. Additionally, it fails to acknowledge that much intersectional work has been dedicated to part ways with postmodernist and ‘anticategorical’ approaches to intersectionality (Mangena, 1994; Strickland, 1994, Crenshaw, 1991). In Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color (1991), Crenshaw herself calls such an approach to intersectional theory “vulgar constructionism” (1991, 1296), and states that it “distorts the possibility for meaningful identity politics” (1991, 1297). Secondly, maintaining the category ‘woman’, and defining it positionally in accordance with critical realism is not inherently contrary to intersectionality. As previously mentioned, intersectionality permits categorisation. Intersectional thought would serve to examine whether this form of categorisation is essentialising and homogenising womanhood, but it does not require eliminating the category.

In line with this last point, in Intersectional Analysis: Black Box or Useful Critical Feminist Thinking Technology? (2011), Lykke thought of intersectionality as a ‘nodal point’ for feminist theory. She argued that it could be a point for cooperation between already conflicting feminist theories. Intersectionality’s ability to carry out this task can be exemplified with the disagreement between liberal and postmodernist feminism when it comes to the use of categories. On the one hand liberal feminism has been criticised for defending an essentialised and exclusionary definition of ‘woman’ (Harding 2004). On the other hand, postmodernist feminism rejects the existence of the category altogether (Butler, 1992, 1993, 1999) which has been criticised because ‘woman’ is the very category that feminist theory is built on. Intersectionality would serve as a tool to bridge these two conceptions. It would acknowledge that liberal feminism fails to consider the complexities of the power relations at play in the lives of many women, without rejecting the category itself.

Therefore, when it comes to intersectionality’s role in feminist theory, both the criticism and the solution presented by Zack and Gunnarsson have already been tackled by intersectionality itself.

 

Intersectionality in the context of joint political action.

   To address Zack and Gunnarsson’s critiques, as they relate to feminist political action, and highlight why intersectionality will not cause fragmentation, it is useful to return to Crenshaw’s original conception. More specifically her conclusion to Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, where she states that “we first must recognise that the organised identity groups in which we find ourselves are in fact coalitions or at least potential coalitions waiting to be formed” (1991, 1299). This claim can be understood in two ways (Carastathis, 2013). Firstly, it can be understood as a reference to the nature of identity itself. In this sense, intersectionality would serve to highlight that to politically organise around identity requires that some people “negotiate the various political interests, conflicting though they may be, that exist within an identity category” (Crenshaw 1995, 12). Such as for example Black women having to reconcile the aims of feminism and antiracism when these are incompatible. Secondly, it can be understood as a reference to the possibility of organising politically across multiple identity groups. In this sense, intersectionality emphasises the existence of interrelations, grounds for solidarity and “new avenues of cooperation” (Cole, 2008) between differing identities. It can be argued that these two understandings are interconnected, and that this interconnection explains why intersectionality does not cause fragmentation.

   The interconnection between both interpretations becomes evident when coalitions are differentiated from identity-based groups. While identity-based groups are built around similarity, coalitions “are born of necessity” (Matsuda, 1991, 1190). Furthermore, Reagon described them as “spaces of difference, confrontation, and risk” (1983). Therefore, it is the inherent nature of coalitions to focus on and directly address difference within a given group, while simultaneously recognising that identities are sometimes born out of a context of shared history and struggle, thus becoming valuable tools for organising (Crenshaw, 1991; Bohrer, 2018). Consequently, far from causing fragmentation, an intersectional approach strengthens feminist political activism. Crenshaw argued that it is an opportunity to build bridges in coalition politics (1994) and taking her point a step further, coalitions allow the creation of political alliances that cross the limits of prevailing identity categories (Keating 2009). This supposes a shift in the way women have organised around feminism because it emphasises the intentionality behind creating a joint movement. In the words of Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “sisterhood cannot be assumed on the basis of gender; it must be forged in concrete historical and political praxis” (1988, 67).

   The success of conceiving identities as coalitions and of using intersectionality as a source for solidarity can be exemplified with “Somos Hermanas” (We Are Sisters), a US based feminist group. During its six years of existence the group took part in feminist, lesbian, anti-racist and anti-imperialist activism. In doing so, the members of the group acted as bridges between all the communities they belonged to. Communities that had historically been falsely separated (Carastathis, 2013). For them, “Somos Hermanas means embracing our sisters in solidarity” (Somos Hermanas, 1985). The sisterhood present in the group was not accidental, nor was it assumed because of their shared gender condition, it was a central part of the project (Mohanty, 1988). The central lesson is that because of understanding their identities as a coalition, “Somos Hermanas” crossed the false boundaries between their identities that had been created by the systems of oppression they existed under (Carastathis, 2013), and built crucial alliances in their feminist fight.

 

From all of the above arguments it can be concluded that the incorporation of an intersectional understanding of identity into feminist thought will not lead to a fragmented feminist movement. This essay has emphasised that concerns about fragmentation are often ignoring the openness of intersectionality and are deliberately using narrow conceptions of the theory such as the postmodernist “anticategorical” approach. Therefore, because it can be interpreted in numerous different ways, whether intersectionality causes fragmentation will largely depend on the specific understanding someone is examining. If intersectionality is understood in accordance with critical realism, then intersectionality has the potential to bridge all branches of feminist theory. Equally, if intersectionality is understood as the coalitions of multiple identities, feminist political action can only strengthen from applying intersectional thought, as proven by the group “Somos Hermanas”.

  

 

 

 

 

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